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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Maritime jurisdiction-End of "Twilight Zone"
Section 3(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act' provides:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in re-
spect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring on the
navigable waters of the United States ... and if recovery for
the disability or death through workmen's compensation pro-
ceedings may not validly be provided by State law.
In Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.' two welders were injured,
one fatally, while performing construction work on unfinished vessels
launched and floating in navigable waters. The injured welder and
the personal representative of the deceased welder claimed benefits
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
The awards were allowed by the Deputy Commissioner and affirmed
in the district courts.3 The court of appeals reversed both judg-
ments,4 holding that since compensation for the workers could valid-
ly be provided by state law, the language of the Longshoremen's
Act precluded recovery under that statute. The two cases were
heard together on certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court
reversed, two justices dissenting.5 The majority found that Con-
gress had enacted the act in order to provide compensation for all
injuries suffered by employees on navigable waters, regardless of
whether the injury was compensable under a state workmen's com-
pensation law.
The history behind this decision points out the difficult area
upon which the instant decision purports to shed light. Before 1917,
it was held by both state' and federal7 courts that the compensation
144 Stat. §§ 1424, 1426-27, 1429, 1431-32, 1434-46 (1927), as amended,
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958).2370 U.S. 114 (1962).
' These cases are apparently unreported.
'Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961); Avondale
Shipyards, Inc. v. Donovan, 293 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1961).
' Justice Stewart and Justice Harlan. Justice Frankfurter did not partici-
pate in the decision.0 Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 AtI. 372 (1915);
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laws of the various states were applicable to all land-based workers,
regardless of the fact that the injury itself might have occurred on
navigable waters. In 1917, however, the Supreme Court in South-
ern Pac. Co. v. Jensen8 decided that state compensation acts could
not validly be applied to stevedores unloading vessels on navigable
waters. The application of the state acts to such injuries, said the
Court, would destroy the uniformity of the general maritime law,
and the state acts to that extent were declared invalid. The imme-
diate result of the Jensen decision was that stevedores were deprived
of any sort of compensation if they had the misfortune of being
injured while on the ship, rather than on the dock where their
injuries would be covered by the state compensation statutes. 9 Two
subsequent federal acts' ° purporting to apply the compensation laws
of the various states to workers injured on navigable waters were
struck down as unconstitutional delegations of authority to the
states.': Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, mindful of the harsh ef-
fects of Jensen, began to restrict that decision somewhat in holding
that certain types of activities were of a maritime nature, but of local
concern, and that as to them, state workmen's compensation statutes
could constitutionally be applied."2 The leading case in this area
Lindstrom v. Mutual S.S. Co., 132 Minn. 328, 156 N.W. 669 (1916). See
generally Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1029 (1923).
Riegel v. Higgins, 241 Fed. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1917); Berton v. Tietjen &
Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 Fed. 763 (D.N.J. 1915). See generally Annot., 25
A.L.R. 1029 (1923).
8244 U.S. 205 (1917).
' The House Judiciary Committee on what later became the Longshore-
men's Act was treated to a humorous example of this undesirable result in
the statement of an attorney for the International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion: "A man was coming down a ladder from the deck of the ship "to the
dock. And he was a pretty fat man; and the boat was out about 2 feet from
the dock. And the rope that was holding the ladder broke ... he fell with
his weight between the ship and the dock. His buttocks struck the dock and
his belly struck the ship. Now, he has a sprained shoulder; assuming tfhat the
sprain took place on the way from the deck down to the dock, the compensa-
tion commission of New York awarded him compensation for injury to the
buttocks, but not for injury to the shoulder." Hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee on, H.R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1926).
" Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 19?2, ch.
216, 42 Stat. 634.
"Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) ; Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920).
" The "local concern" doctrine was first mentioned in Western Fuel Co.
v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921), where, although the action was held barred by
the applicable statute of limitations, the Court stated: "The subject is mari-
time and local in character, and the specified modification of or supplement
to the rule applied to admiralty courts, when following the common law,
[Vol. 41
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was Grant-Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 3 which held that a worker
performing construction work on an unfinished vessel floating on
navigable waters was engaged in an activity purely local in scope,
and that the application of the Oregon Workmen's Compensation
Act to his injuries would work no prejudice to the uniformity of the
general maritime law.
Although Rohde and like decisions14 mitigated the damage
wrought by Jensen as to certain classes of workers, the stevedore
injured on the ship he was unloading was still without a remedy.
This result adversely affected a very substantial number of persons, 5
and there was an appeal from employers and employees alike for
effective relief. Congress, after seeing their two previous attempts
at solving the problem rendered impotent by the Court, took notice
of the constitutional problem involved, and the new attempt was
built around a piece of judicial admonishment in Washington v.
W. C. Dawson & Co. 6 to the effect that uniform federal legislation
should be enacted in order to cover those injuries rendered non-
compensable by the Court.' An examination of the various com-
will not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that
law. ... " 257 U.S. at 242.
- 257 U.S. 469 (1922). In deciding the case, the Court relied heavily on
the dictum set out only a month earlier in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra
note 12.
", See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467
(1928) (fisherman injured while pushing boat off shore into navigable
waters); Millers' Indem. Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926) (diver
sawing off timbers on abandoned launching ways); Sunny Point Packing
Co. v. Faigh, 63 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1933) (watchman stationed on floating
fish trap fastened to shore).
1 Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on the proposed
Longshoremen's Act indicated that there were approximately 250,000 persons
who would be affected by the act. Hearings before the House Committee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1926).16264 U.S. 219 (1924).1 7
"Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the mari-
time law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment.
This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general employers'
liability law, or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but
it may not be delegated to the several states. The grant of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction looks to uniformity ... ." 264 U.S. at 227. The
original draft of the Longshoremen's Act was carefully worded in order
to be in accordance with this dictum. See, e.g., Hearings before a Subcoin-
inittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1926), where the following exchange is recorded: "Mr. Chamber-
lain.... And in this last decision [referring to the Dawson case], being
pressed on that point, the court says that compensation is possible under
the admiralty power of Congress. So the bill is based on that theory of the
19631
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mittee and subcommittee hearings on the proposed bill shows that
the purpose of Congress was to provide compensation only for those
who were left without a remedy by the decisions of the Supreme
Court, and that as to the others, the states could supply an adequate
remedy."8 The dissent in the principal case quotes the Senate Com-
mittee Report: "If longshoremen could avail themselves of the bene-
fits of the State compensation laws, there would be no occasion for
this legislation . . . ," 9 One motivating factor giving rise to this
general attitude may well have been the differences in the rate scales
of the Longshoremen's Act and the compensation acts of the states.20
In certain states, the rates were somewhat lower than those under
the federal act.2 Therefore, the locus of the injury might have
made a substantial difference in the compensation payable for a given
injury. This result was patently undesirable, containing a vast
potential for perjured claims, and for policy reasons, it would seem
that situations where one worker could be covered by two acts
should have been kept at a minimum.
At any rate, the bill as it was first introduced appeared to reflect
a desire to leave within state jurisdiction exclusively those marginal
cases which the Court had decided were within the "local concern"
concept. It read in part: "This act shall apply to any employment
performed on a place within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States, except employment of local concern and of no direct rela-
tion to navigation and commerce ....
It was immediately recognized that the latter clause, if left in
court. Senator Overman. This bill is based on that decision. Mr. Cham-
berlain. It is based on that suggestion. And really there would be no way
possible to take care of the situation otherwise that I know of."
18 See Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1926), where an attorney
representing the Longshoremen's Union indicated widespread agreement
among all parties concerned that State law should handle the situation. "But
it [the bill] is designed to give a remedy where the State compensation law
does not protect a man or his family... ." Id. at 25. Discussion before the
House Committee contains language of similar import. See Hearings before
the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
39 (1926).
19 S. REP. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1926).
20 See Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 9498, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1926), where the reported discussion reflects an uneasi-
ness concerning this part of the bill on the part of a large employers' associa-
tion.
2 Id. at 51-52.
2 Id. at 2; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1926).
(Vol. 41
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its then existing state, would foster much litigation.23  The litiga-
tion would, of course, have been avoided entirely by the simple
deletion of the offending clause. The House Committee in redraft-
ing the bill did in fact omit the clause.24 But at some point in the
proceedings, the House Committee changed its collective mind, de-
ciding instead to accept the revision made by the Senate Commit-
tee.2" That draft, accepted by both Committees and later by Con-
gress, read substantially as it does today, i.e., that compensation was
payable under the act only if state law could not provide a remedy.2 6
The majority in Calbeck found that the latter change gave rise
to a "reasonable inference" that Congress meant to avoid the poten-
tial litigation inherent in the "local concern" exception ;21 that their
true purpose was to "provide compensation for all injuries sustained
by employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury
might also have been within the constitutional reach of a state work-
men's compensation law,"28 and that the final wording was accepted,
and later passed, in its present form only because of a "parliamen-
tary obstacle"29 to its further revision. The very fact that Congress,
when faced with an obvious solution to the dilemma of impending liti-
gation, chose instead to use language just as pregnant with potential
lawsuits does not appear to support the majority's opinion that one
of the primary purposes of Congress was to avoid litigation. On
the contrary, it suggests that Congress was unwilling to extend
federal jurisdiction any further than necessity demanded, albeit at
the expense of some legal uncertainty. The dissent offers a more
logical reason for the change in language. Conceivably, the Court
might choose to extend state jurisdiction beyond the bounds of
"local concern"; if so, the final wording of the act would be broad
enough to cover these changes, making the federal law inapplicable
in such cases.30
After the passage of the Longshoremen's Act in 1927, the clause
excluding from federal coverage those injuries compensable under
" See, e.g., Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on
H.R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1926).
"H.R. Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1927).
25 There is apparently no record of the deliberations leading to the House
Committee's change in the language of the act.
S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1926).
370 U.S. at 123.
2 8 Id. at 117.
2 9 Id. at 124.
*Old. at 135 n.4.
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state law produced, as expected, rather heavy litigation."' The
"maritime but local" concept continued to lend an air of uncertainty
as to what relief a particular worker was entitled, and in which
court. Each case was decided on its own separate facts, and it be-
came apparent that if an injured employee made a wrong guess as
to the jurisdiction of his case, he might be denied recovery under
either the state or the federal act, due to the relatively short statutes
of limitations common to most workmen's compensation acts.82
This was clearly not the intent of Congress.83 Accordingly, in
Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus.,4 the Supreme Court held
that where the facts of a particular case were such that counsel
could not accurately predict, in the light of existing case law, the
'proper forum in which to bring action, there would be a presump-
tion that his choice was correct, and in effect recovery would be
allowable in either court. The Court termed the doubtful area the
"twilight zone.""5
After announcing the "twilight zone" doctrine, the Court pro-
ceeded to apply it in subsequent cases where, before the existence
of the doctrine, there would have been no question as to jurisdic-
tion.36
When the principal case came before the court of appeals, 7 the
issue was whether the injury came within a "twilight zone" ren-
dered overly elastic by those decisions. Apparently, neither party
seriously contended that the federal act was applicable to all injuries
suffered on navigable waters. Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit
was of the opinion that the "twilight zone" could not apply, because
under the Rohde case an injury suffered by an employee engaged in
" See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. McManigal, 87 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.
1937); United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 639 (1933); Puget Sound Nay. Co. v. Marshall, 31 F. Supp. 903
(W.D. Wash. 1940).
" See, e.g., Ayers v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D. Md. 1936).
" "Such a result defeats the purpose of the federal act, which seeks to give
'to these hard-working men, engaged in a somewhat hazardous employment,
the justice involved in the modern principle of compensation' ...." Davis v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 254 (1942).
8'317 U.S. 249 (1942).
s" Id. at 256.
"O See Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953);
Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949) ; Bethlehem Steel Co.
v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874, affirning per curiam Moores v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948). See generally Baer, ADMIRALTY
LAw OF THE SUPREME COURT 75-83 (1963).
'Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961).
[Vol. 41
NOTES AND COMMENTS
construction of an unfinished vessel afloat on navigable waters was
clearly compensable under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation
Act, and thus the claimants could not recover under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Act. 8
The majority of the Supreme Court, in reversing the apparently
logical decision of Judge Brown, found that all injuries suffered by
employees on navigable waters were within the act, despite the lan-
guage of section 3(a) .3  The dissent notes that if the instant
decision be taken at face value, then the problem which gave rise to
the "twilight zone" never existed ;40 certainly, there is now no longer
a need for it. By the judicial deletion of an entire phrase of the
act, the Court has eliminated the uncertainty which marked the
"maritime but local" area, and there is little doubt that this is a
desirable result.4 ' The method by which that result is reached,
however, seems to set an alarming precedent. The Court as late as
1959 had recognized the existence of the "twilight zone" and the
terms of the act which it emasculated in Calbeck ;4' even some of the
cases cited by the majority as being "entirely consistent" with their
conclusion contain much language suggesting just the opposite re-
sult.4
3
In view of the result reached in the principal case, the Court's
next step may well be to hold injuries on navigable waters not
compensable under state acts under any circumstances. Such a de-
cision would, of course, do violence to a large body of case law,44 but
would be consistent with the basis of the Jensen case, i.e., uniformity
of the general maritime law, and, when considered with Calbeck,
would also point out a clear procedural path where before lay un-
certainty: if the injury is sustained on navigable waters, recovery
38 Id. at 59. o370 U.S. at 117.
,o Id. at 137.
"1 Justice Stewart, speaking for the dissent in the principal case, writes:
"While the result reached today may be a desirable one, it is simply not what
the law provides." Id. at 132.
" Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959).
" "Congress having expressly kept out of the area in which 'recovery...
may... validly be provided by State law ....'" Parker v. Motor Boat Sales,
Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 247 (1941); "Here again, however, Congress made clear
its purpose to permit state compensation protection whenever possible by
making the federal law applicable only 'if recovery... may not validly be
provided by state law.'" Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S.
249, 252-53 (1942).
"E.g., Grant-Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); United
States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 290 U.S. 639(1933).
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will be under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act; and
if the injury is sustained on land, the state workmen's compensation
proceedings will provide the remedy.
STEPHEN C. COWPER
Early Statutory and Common Law of Divorce in North Carolina
American courts and legislatures have for a century and a half
looked with disfavor on the dissolution of marriage.' In so doing
they have created a fifty-headed hydra of an internecine complexity
unparalled in the law. Here we shall investigate the birth and early
childhood of that great serpent in North Carolina.
At the outset it is well to agree on just what is meant by the
term "divorce." Historically, it has been used to describe four dis-
tinct remedies affecting the marital status: (1) divorce a mensa et
thoro, (2) divorce a vinculo matrimonii by legislative act, (3) di-
vorce a vinculo matrimonii by judicial decree, and (4) annulment.
At common law the term "divorce" properly comprehended only
the divorce a mensa et thoro, commonly known as legal separation or
divorce from bed and board, although annulment was often incor-
rectly termed "absolute divorce." 2 In its modern sense, as a dissolu-
tion of a valid existing marriage, "divorce" means a divorce a
vinculo matrimonii by judicial decree8 or legislative act.4 The latter
has become obsolete.
1 "We reconcile ourselves to what is inevitable. Experience finds pain
more tolerable than it was expected to be; and habit makes even fetters light.
Exertion, when known to be useless, is unassayed; though the struggle might
be violent, if by possibility it could be successful. A married couple thus
retrained may become, if not devoted in their affections, at least discreet
partners, striving together for the common good, and steady friends, ready
to perform all offices of kindness required by the other-instead of the dis-
sentient heads of a distracted family, driven by inflamed passions to a
degree of madness not to be satisfied with less than an entire separation,
though it bring disgrace on themselves and their offspring, and deprive the
latter of the greatest earthly advantage, the nurture and admonitions of a
parent." Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. 535, 542 (1832). Compare the
views of South Carolina and Georgia: "The policy of this State has ever
been against divorces. It is one of her boasts that no divorce has ever been
granted in South Carolina." Hair v. Hair, 31 S.C. Eq. 163, 174 (1858).
"[I]n South Carolina... to her unfading honor, a divorce has not been
granted since the Revolution ... ." Head v. Head, 2 Ga. 191, 196 (1847).
2 This convenient dichotomy caused some confusion. See, e.g., Crump v.
Morgan, 38 N.C. 91 (1843).
'Absolute divorce by judicial decree was unknown in England until the
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. ch. 85. There were a few
instances of such decrees during the early years of the Reformation, but it
[Vol. 41
